We document that, in the U.S., the share of financial assets that have a direct counterpart in the financial system has increased by between 15.8 and 21.8 percentage points during the period 1952-2011. Using a SVAR and a FAVAR, we find that, during the same period, the impulse responses of several real and financial variables to monetary policy shocks dampened. To relate these two trends, we present a stylized model that illustrates how interbank trading can reduce the sensitivity of lending to the entrepreneur's net worth, thus affecting the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the credit channel.
Introduction
Two facts constitute the background of this paper. First, the U.S. financial system underwent a radical transformation during the last decades. The complexity and the nature of the process of financial intermediation changed substantially.
1 Figure 1 confirms this well known phenomenon by reporting the evolution of the share of total assets in the U.S. economy held by three major groups of actors: i) the traditional actors (commercial banks, savings institutions and credit unions), ii) the insurance, pension and mutual funds, and iii) the so called "shadow banking system" (Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), Assets-backedsecurities issuers, GSE mortgage pools, finance companies, brokers and dealers). 2 While the share of assets held by the traditional actors declined from about 60% to roughly 30% from 1952 to 2010, the share of assets held by the "new" actors increased from almost zero to more than 40% in 2006.
Second, a well known result in the economic literature is that in more recent samples, the sensitivity of real variables to monetary policy shocks has declined. A common explanation for this empirical finding is an increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy, as for example proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2006) . Another frequently conjectured (but less studied) hypothesis is that structural changes in the financial sector contributed to the changing nature of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 3 Arguably, at least a part of the difficulty in addressing this hypothesis is the lack of a suitable measure of the structural transformation that affected the U.S. financial system.
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In this paper, we propose a measure for this structural transformation, and study its 3 A notable exception is Dynan et al (2006) , who analyses the impact of monetary policy on real activity before and after relevant regulatory changes. 4 Contributions in this literature analyze the different responsiveness across different sub-samples of the data.
by between 15.8 and 21.8 percentage points during the period 1952-2011. We suggest that this increase in interconnectedness within the financial sector may have been one of the reasons for the observed lower sensitivity of the real economy to monetary shocks. We interact our measure with both a SVAR and a FAVAR for the U.S. economy, and find that the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks are dampened as the financial system becomes more interconnected. While we do not claim that this is the only possible explanation for the smaller responses of real variables to monetary policy shocks, we argue that interconnectedness might be a contributing factor that has been previously overlooked. Moreover, we present a stylized model that rationalizes our empirical findings by illustrating how interbank trading can reduce the sensitivity of lending to the entrepreneur's net worth, thereby dampening the credit channel transmission of monetary policy.
We proceed in three steps. First, we propose as a measure of the structural transformation of the financial sector, the extent to which it is interconnected. The Measure of Interconnectedness is the share of the credit market instruments represented by claims whose direct counterpart belongs to the financial sector. We compute the measure of interconnectedness for the U.S. financial system for the period 1952-2011, using data from the Flows of Funds.
We describe the evolution of the single components of the aggregate measure, and we show the relation between the evolution of our measure and key changes in the U.S. financial regulatory system. Moreover, we discuss the relation between our measure and a measure of liquidity, another factor that has been proposed to affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 5 Second, we propose an empirical analysis of the interaction between our measure of interconnectedness and the response of real activity to monetary policy. We first illustrate through simple autoregressive distributed lag regressions (ADL) that the dynamic correlation between the detrended GDP and the Fed Funds Rate are dampened when our measure of interconnectedness increases. Then, we interact our measure of interconnectedness with a structural vector auto-regression (VAR) for the U.S. economy, and produce impulse responses to a monetary policy shock conditional on different levels of interconnectedness. Finally, we propose a Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model where we produce impulse responses for a large set of real and financial variables. Once again, these impulse responses depend on our measure of interconnectedness. We find that the responses to a monetary policy shock of both real variables, like the GDP, investment and employment and of financial variables, like loans and leases are significantly dampened as the financial sector becomes more interconnected.
Third, in light of our empirical findings, we develop a model in which interbank trading reduces the economy's sensitivity to monetary policy. We focus on the credit transmission channel: lowering the nominal interest rate raises the net worth of borrowers, thereby increasing their "skin in the game" and making them less prone towards taking excessive risk.
Banks respond by extending additional credit, which leads to additional investment. Our model's main insight is that this transmission mechanism depends crucially on the presence of a tension between the entrepreneur's preference towards risky projects and the bank's demand for safety (resulting from the need to pay depositors at par). In the presence of an interbank market, banks can pool risk by securitizing their loan portfolios and diversifying their assets; the tension between the borrower's preference towards risky projects and the bank's need to pay depositors at par disappears, and with it the credit channel transmission of monetary policy. This paper is linked to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature dealing with measurement of financial intermediation and its characteristics. Philippon of the financial sector using network analysis. This literature, however, is more concerned with the implication of interconnectedness for systemic risk than with the implications for monetary policy. information of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Bianchi and Bigio (2014) propose a quantitative model to study the transmission of monetary policy through a banking system. None of these papers, however, analyzes the financial sector interconnectedness 7 See for for instance Acemoglu et al. (2013) , Farboodi (2014) and the many references therein. 8 A recently proposed complementary channel through which changes in the financial conditions can affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is the "risk taking channels", proposed by Borio and Zhu (2012) . See also Bruno and Shin (2013) .
as a factor potentially affecting the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our measure of interconnectedness and document its evolution in the U.S. In Section 3 we present our empirical analysis. In Section 4 we outline our stylized theoretical model. Section 5 concludes with several suggestions for future research.
The Measure of Interconnectedness
Our proposed measure of interconnectedness of a financial sector (or a financial institution) is based on the composition of its assets. The Measure of Interconnectedness (IN T ER) is conceptually the share of the credit market instruments (CREDIT ) represented by claims whose direct counterparts belong to the financial sector (CREDIT F IN AN CE):
The Flow of Funds database provides a quarterly snapshot of the U.S. financial system balance sheet. 9 For our baseline measure, we focus on credit market instruments, which include mortgages, loans, consumer credit, treasuries, municipal bonds, corporate and foreign bonds, open market papers and Agency and GSE-backed securities.
Unfortunately, the level of aggregation of the data in the Flow of Funds prevents us from perfectly measuring the expressionin equation (1) . Therefore, we compute two different measures, which we interpret as a lower-bound and an upper-bound for the concept we want to capture.
We label the first as IN T ER 1 , and compute it simply as the ratio between total Agency and GSE-backed securities and total credit market instruments. Especially in more recent times, these securities represented an essential element of the growth of the interconnectedness of the financial network, fostered by the process of securitization. Mortgages originated by banks and mortgage brokers were sold to special investment vehicles (SIV). These SIVs 9 were then issuing different "tranches" of securities, which were backed by those mortgages, and characterized by a stratified risk profile. The safest of these emissions (the "Senior Tranches") were often given triple-A ratings, and hence could be bought by some players in the financial system (such as pension funds) which can only invest in safe securities. 10 Another important drawback of using Flow of Funds data is that we are not able to say much about non-balance sheet items, such as derivatives. Since derivatives are typically used as a common example of the interconnectedness of the financial sector, we are aware that we are missing an important piece of information, which would make of IN T ER 2 an inaccurate estimate of an upper bound for the concept of financial sector interconnectedness. However, we can confidently say that IN F ER 1 represent a lower-bound estimates of the interconnectedness of the financial sector, and this is the reason why in our empirical section we will use it as our benchmark.
11 In fact, the correlation between the two is 0.99. 12 These two asset classes represent the difference between the numerators of IN T ER 1 and IN T ER 2 .
the share of mortgages over total credit market instruments. After the big rise in the fifties, sixties and seventies, during the eighties and the nineties, the share of mortgages in total credit declines steadily. Then, we see a huge increase in the mortgage share during the early two-thousands. The securities backed by those mortgages were partly sold outside of the U.S. and bought by foreign investors. 13 So, while U.S. mortgages were growing, the securities backed by those mortgages recorded as assets by U.S. financial institutions, and thus included in the Flow of Funds asset data, were growing by less, thus explaining our declining measure of interconnectedness during the U.S. housing bubble.
We also construct alternative measures of interconnectedness which, rather than focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, focus on the liability side. Consistent with our explanation, we show that the liability-based measure does not decline during the housing bubble. In particular, we compute a measure IN T ER 3 which is the ratio of credit market instruments and repurchasing agreements over total liabilities, and a restricted measure IN T ER 4 , which is the ratio of credit market instruments and repurchasing agreements over a smaller set of liabilities.
14 In Figure 5 we report the results obtained for these alternative of global scope, which is financial interconnectedness. That said, the advantages of our measures are that they are simple, readily available, and potentially extendible to other countries as well as to single financial institutions. 15 We therefore suggest that, despite their limits, our measures can be useful for investigating the interplay between financial sector interconnectedness and the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Before proceeding in our investigation, we make three remarks regarding: i) the relation between interconnectedness and liquidity, ii) the relation between our measure and financial deregulation, and iii) the relation between our measure and the share of finance in GDP. Measure of interconnectedness and the share of finance in GDP. It is instructive to investigate the relation between our measures of interconnectedness and the share of finance in GDP, constructed by Philippon (2012) . In Figure 9 , we plot our measures together with the share of finance in non-defense value added.
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While the two series are conceptually different, they are interestingly highly correlated. 
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Since this paper focuses mainly on the implications for monetary policy of the structural transformation that affected the U.S. financial system, we focus in what follows on our measure of interconnectedness, without taking a strong stance on its contribution to the increase in the share of finance in GDP. 17 A second reinterpretation would follow in 1996, when the ceiling on the maximum revenues obtainable from investment banking activities was lifted to 25%, though this does not seem to have any significant impact on the trend of our measures. 18 WhilePhilippon's data are at annual frequency, we interpolated them to transform them into a quarterly series. 19 The correlation between the two series is 0.98. 20 Another recent explanation of Philippon's results can be found in Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2013), who propose a Solow-type growth model augmented with a financial intermediation process featuring a role for trust. In their model, the share of finance over GDP grows over time due to the role of financial intermediation as a tool for wealth management in an environment where the ratio of wealth to GDP grows as the economy approaches its steady state.
Interconnectedness and Monetary Policy: Evidence
This section presents some time series evidence to explore how interconnectedness affects the responses of economic variables to monetary policy. We take an eclectic approach and present evidence coming from i) autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) regressions, aiming at capturing simple dynamic correlations, ii) a structural VAR (SVAR) approach and iii) a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR).
ADL Regressions. We first explore the dynamic correlations between our variables of interest by using autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) regressions. We postulate an ADL (p,1) model to study the sensitivity of a macroeconomic aggregate Y t to monetary policy (F F R). We also add an interaction term between the Fed Funds Rate and our Measure of
Interconnectedness (IN T ER):
where ρ(L) is a p-order lag polynomial and ε t is a white noise process uncorrelated with all regressors. The optimal number of lags p to include is selected through Bayesian information criteria (BIC). Our coefficient of interest is β 3 , which we expect to be positive, and hence signal a dampening of the negative effect of the increase in the fed fund rate on the outcome variable of interest. We will present the results obtained both using IN T ER 1 , thus the measure computed using the asset side of the balance sheet, and using the measure IN T ER 3 , which exploit information from the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
In Table 1 , we report the results for detrended GDP. In the first three columns, we report the results obtained using the measure IN T ER 1 . As the Table shows, the fed funds rate displays a negative and statistically significant coefficient, while the interaction term with our measure of interconnectedness displays a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient. 21 In the second column, we report the results obtained with the measure of liquidity. 21 Note that we are reporting p-values in parentheses.
Also in this case, the interaction term with the federal fund rate is positive and (weakly) statistically significant. However, when we insert both variables (interconnectedness and liquidity) in column three, only the interaction term with our measure of interconnectedness maintains its statistical significance. Columns four and five present similar results obtained with the measure IN T ER 3 . Table 2 reports similar results obtained from using the annualized rate of GDP growth as our dependent variable, and Table 3 reports the results obtained using annualized growth of loans and leases as the dependent variable. We use this financial outcome variable because the model presented in Section 4 is based on a credit channel for monetary policy. Table 3 broadly confirms the result of a dampening effect of our measure of interconnectedness on the negative effect of an increase of the federal fund rate on the growth of loans and leases, albeit with a somewhat weaker statistical significance than the one found for detrended GDP and GDP growth.
The results presented in Tables 1-3 SVAR. In order to explore the responses of the real variables to a monetary policy shock, and how these change with financial sector interconnectedness, we adapt the approach of Boivin and Giannoni (2006) by including our measure of interconnectedness IN T ER as an exogenous variable. 22 While our measure might be an endogenous variable, the result obtained in Figure 2 indicates that the movements in the interconnectedness are more longrun smooth movements, and thus we believe it can be considered as exogenous when using business cycle frequency data. In addition, the interconnectedness is included with one lag.
The model can be written as follows:
where Y t is a K ×1 vector of endogenous variables, Φ(L) is a matrix polynomial of order p and IN T ER t−1 is exogenous. The reduced form errors, e t , are assumed to be linear combinations of structural shocks, ε t :
It is easy to see that the impulse responses to any shock in ε t will depend on IN T ER t−1 .
For simplicity, we assume p = 2. Developing Φ(L), we get:
where Φ 1,t−1 = (Φ 1 + βIN T ER t−1 ). Hence, the impulse response functions (IRFs) are obtained for any level of IN T ER t−1 by inverting the previous expression:
In practice, the coefficient matrices Φ(L) and β are estimated by OLS regression on (3), and H is deduced by imposing enough identification restrictions. The IRFs are then easily computed using (4). The confidence bands can be constructed using a parametric bootstrap. 24 Following Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Y t contains the deviation of the natural logarithm of quarterly real GDP (GDPQ) from a linear deterministic trend, the annualized 23 We thus implicitly assume here a time-invariant distribution of the shocks. 24 We use the following procedure:
1. Shuffle the time dimension of OLS residualsê t and get bootstrap innovations e * t rate of change in the quarterly GDP deflator (GDPD), the natural logarithm of the quarterly average of the monthly spot market commodity price index (PSCCOM) and the quarterly In Figure ( generates a decrease in output, which exhibits a hump-shaped response. The price level decreases too, but only after a few quarters (the well known price puzzle phenomenon). When we consider a higher level of interconnectedness of 0.11, instead, we see that the response of the GDP to the same monetary policy shock is now much lower. 26 Also the responses of the quarterly GDP deflator and the spot market commodity price index are muted at the higher level of interconnection. Interestingly, there is no evidence of price puzzle in that case.
In order to assess whether the difference in the impulse response we obtained under different levels of interconnectedness is statistically significant, we plot the difference in 
3. Impose the identification restrictions to get H and calculate impulse responses. 25 The results obtained using the other measures, are broadly in line with what we present in the paper. We omitted them due to space constraints, and they are available upon request. 26 In an unreported result, we show that this response is in fact not statistically different from zero. As in the case of SVAR, we introduce our measure of interconnectedness through interaction terms, in order to obtain impulse response functions that are conditional on a certain level of interconnectedness. Formally, we consider the following static factor model with 27 We omitted the results here, they are available upon request. 28 If the shocks in the VAR model are fundamental, then the dynamic effects implied by the moving average representation can have a meaningful interpretation, i.e. the structural shocks can be recovered from current and past values of observable series. Forni et al. (2009) argue that while non-fundamentalness is generic of small scale models, it is highly unlikely to arise in large dimensional dynamic factor models. latent and observed factors:
where F t is vector of K latent factors and R t is the observed factor. In our case, R t is the the Federal Funds Rate, since the objective here is to identify the monetary policy shock. X t contains N macroeconomic and financial indicators organized into a block of 'slow-moving'
variables that are largely predetermined to monetary policy, and another consisting of 'fast moving' variables that are sensitive to the Fed's rule. The idiosyncratic errors are assumed such that (5) is an approximate factor model (see Bai and Ng (2006) for details).
In our application, X t contains N = 108 quarterly time series from Ng and Stevanovic tor increases. This is true both for quantities (bank credit, loans and leases, and real estate loans) and, to a lesser extent, for prices (in particular the BBA spread). These responses are consistent with the mechanism that we will propose in the next Section, based on the sensitivity of lenders to the financial soundness of the borrowers.
In order to test whether these differences are statistically significant, we compute the difference between the impulse responses and we compute via bootstrap a 90% confidence internal. In Figure ( We conclude that the inclusion of our measure of interconnectedness into a SVAR or a 30 Also for the case of the FAVAR, we repeated our procedure using all the measures proposed in Section 2, and we obtained very similar results. 
Interconnectedness and Monetary Policy: Theory
We present a stylized model that captures a possible relationship between the interconnectedness of the financial sector and the sensitivity of real activity to monetary policy. Of course, there are many possible mechanisms through which financial interconnectedness may alter monetary policy transmission. We focus on the credit channel transmission of monetary policy, and show how a financial sector more interconnected implies a lower sensitivity of lending to monetary policy shocks.
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There are two periods indexed t = 0, 1, and a unit measure of islands. Each island has a unit measure of savers, a unit measure of banks, and a unit measure of borrowers. Each saver is endowed with 1 unit of the final good at t = 0. Savers value consumption only at t = 1, so they deposit their savings at a bank. Banks cannot write contingent contracts with depositors: rather, they must offer some certain return of 1 + r d . Banks are competitive: savers deposit their endowment in the bank that promises the highest return. In equilibrium, all banks post the same deposit rate r d , and we can therefore assume that each bank receives 1 unit of deposits.
Banks have access only to depositors and borrowers from their own island. In addition, banks can store deposits at a rate of return of 1; this store of value will be referred to as "money" (m). The interest rate that the borrower (entrepreneur) faces is denoted by r.
The entrepreneur can choose to invest in a risky project or in a safe project. The gross return on the safe project is 1. The gross return on the risky project is R > 2 with probability 0.5, and 0 otherwise (in other words, the mean of the risky project is higher than the mean of the safe project). The entrepreneur is risk neutral. Importantly, the success of the risky project is perfectly correlated across entrepreneurs within an island, and independent across islands. This reflects some local risk associated with investment, which washes out in the aggregate.
If the entrepreneur cannot repay his debt, his wealth A ≥ 0 is taken away from him. We assume that A is an indivisible asset, that is valuable to the entrepreneur but has no resale value; in other words, taking away A is a threat to the entrepreneur, but does not yield any benefits to the lending bank. In addition, A cannot be sold in order to repay the debt. This assumption is useful as it simplifies the analysis, and can be thought of as an extreme form of the more standard assumption that the liquidation value is lower than the continuation value. 32 The expected return to investing I r > 0 units in the risky project is then:
We assume the following parametric restriction:
This assumption guarantees that, if r = 0, there are strictly positive returns for the entrepreneur from choosing I r = 1. (0.5(R − (1 + r))I r − 0.5Aχ{I r > 0} + I s (−r)
32 However, making this more standard assumption would not affect the main qualitative results of our model, at the cost of complicating the analysis. 33 For this to be true, it would be sufficient, from (7), the weaker condition R − A ≥ 1. The reason why we make a stronger parametric restriction is going to be clearer later.
s.t.:
I s + I r = I (10)
where χ{I r > 0} is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if I r > 0 and 0 otherwise.
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The bank maximizes expected profits at t = 1, subject to the constraint that it must have enough profits to repay depositors. It allocates its unit of deposits between loans (I) and money (m). Importantly, the bank can only choose the size of loans I; it cannot choose I s and I r directly. It solves:
s.t.
(1 + r(I, s))I + m ≥ 1 + r d (14) where r(I, s) is the state dependent return to loans, given a loan size of I. In other words, if the entrepreneur is unable to repay the loan, r(I, s) = −1; otherwise r(I, s) = r(I).
Benchmark: no interbank markets. In the absence of an interbank market, an equilibrium is defined as a set (I, To solve for the equilibrium, note that, as banks must repay depositors, they cannot take on the risk of failed projects. The bank therefore chooses the size of the loan so that the entrepreneur does not choose to invest in the risky project. 35 In this case, r d = 0 as a rate 34 Notice that if the entrepreneur chooses the safe project, whose return is 1, the profits for him are equal to 1 − 1 − r. 35 It is assumed that the bank can observe the entrepreneur's credit with other banks, and takes the market interest rate schedule r(I) as given.
of return of 1 is the maximum that any bank can guarantee. When R > 1 + r, it is easy to see that this can be achieved only when A > 0 and:
It follows that r(I) = 0 for I ≤ A R−1
and r(I) = ∞ otherwise. In other words, the bank rations credit to induce entrepreneurs to select the safe project.
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In this environment, the quantity of lending is sensitive to A. In equilibrium, the en-
. Note that given the parametric restriction we made, this is an interior solution, with I s < 1. Hence, changes in his net worth (A) translate into changes in the quantity of of investment:
For simplicity, we assume in the background an interaction between monetary policy and I + m = 1 (18) and, for every state s:
Where r(s) is now defined as the equilibrium return on securitized loans in state s. The definition of equilibrium is now modified to include I sec and I d that must be optimal for the bank given p. The market clearing condition for p is I sec = I d (otherwise, p implies either excess supply or excess demand of securities).
We conjecture an equilibrium in which banks sell their entire loan portfolio (I sec = I) at the price p, and buy a diversified portfolio of loans (I d = I). Entrepreneurs implement the risky project, and the interest rate is such that entrepreneurs make no profits from investing
The interest schedule r(I) is given by r(I) = R − A − 1 for I ≤ 1 and r(I) = ∞ otherwise.
The price p is the expected return to securities, p = 0.5(1 + r) = 0.5(R − A). Since I = I r , m = 0, and I sec = I d , the bank's (deterministic) profits are given by the expected value of securitized loans minus the gross return on deposits:
The deposit rate r d is then determined by the zero profit condition, that sets r d = 0.5(R − A) − 1, which is positive given our parametric restriction.
Note that this is an equilibrium, as banks competing for deposits would like to offer the highest possible deposit rate; any deviation from this strategy would result either in losses (for a higher deposit rate) or in no deposits (for a lower deposit rate). Furthermore, it is easy to see that given r(I) and p, neither banks nor entrepreneurs can make strictly positive profits from deviating from the proposed equilibrium strategies. 37 In this environment, banks have no incentive to ration credit in order to induce entrepreneurs to stay away from the risky project; thus, in this equilibrium, I = 1 and the entire deposits are invested in the risky project. This corner solution implies that banks' lending decisions are insensitive to small changes in the borrower's net worth:
In other words, equation (22) is equivalent to a situation where interbank trading makes banks insensitive to the net worth of their borrowers, and, in this environment, insensitive to monetary policy.
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Measure of interconnectedness and sensitivity to monetary policy. In this context, the measure of interconnectedness presented in Section 2 can be thought of as a function of the measure of islands that are parts of the interbank market. Assume that a measure λ ≤ 1 of islands are able to share risk, while a measure 1 − λ of islands do not participate in interbank markets. Note that the λ banks that participate in interbank markets have the 37 To see this, note that the entrepreneur's profits are 0. If the entrepreneur invests I r < 1, his expected profits are negative because:
Furthermore, since r(I) = ∞ for I > 1, the entrepreneur cannot make strictly positive profits from choosing I > 1. Obviously, since the return to the safe project is 1 there are no profits to be made from choosing I s > 0. To see that the bank cannot increase its by deviating from the schedule r(I), note that if a bank offers r(I) < R − A − 1 for I ≤ 1 it will be unable to sell its securities at the price p, as the expected return is lower than p. The bank will then be unable to diversify and will not be able to repay depositors in all states. If a bank offers r(I) > R − A − 1 for I ≤ 1 it will be unable to lend as entrepreneurs will prefer to borrow from another bank. The bank obviously cannot lend more than I = 1 so it cannot increase its profits by changing r(I) = ∞ for I > 1.
38 See Hobjin and Ravenna (2010) for a more quantitative model of bank securitization and monetary policy transmission.
following balance sheet. On the asset side, banks hold securities from other banks amounting to the value of deposits. On their liability side, they have deposits. Thus, all of their assets and none of their liabilities have counterparts that are in the financial system. The banks measure of interconnectedness is therefore 1, and the aggregate measure of interconnectedness is therefore λ. Moreover, the aggregate sensitivity to changes in A (and hence to monetary policy) is:
Quite clearly, we see from equation (23) that the sensitivity of real activity to monetary policy is decreasing in the interconnectedness of the financial sector (proxied by λ), consistent with our empirical results presented in Section 3.
Conclusions
This paper documents a rising trend in the share of financial claims whose direct counterpart is in the financial sector. The financial sector's increased ability to buffer idiosyncratic liquidity shocks may have contributed to a decrease in the sensitivity of investment to fundamentals such as the borrower's net worth. In this paper, we illustrate how this may have contributed to the dampening of the responsiveness to monetary policy. Of course, the implications of this structural change in the financial system may go far beyond the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We outline here several potential avenues for future research that make use of the measure of interconnectedness.
First, it would be interesting to develop a quantitative macroeconomic model embedding the concept of interconnectedness explored in this paper. This could also be used to evaluate the relative importance of the policy behavior and the interconnectedness in explaining the muted responses of monetary policy innovations on economic variables found using more recent samples.
Second, it may be insightful to analyze the dynamics of the interconnection of the financial sector for additional countries, and study how connection was related to performance during the Great Recession.
Finally, and especially for policy purposes, it would be important to go beyond the aggregate perspective we take in this paper and use balance sheet data on single financial institutions to analyze the impact of their interconnection with other financial firms on a range of performance measures. This could also help improve the regulation and monitoring of financial institutions. We plan to pursue these avenues in our future research.
A Appendix: Data Used in the FAVAR
The transformation codes are: 1 no transformation; 2 first difference; 4 logarithm; 5 first difference of logarithm; 0 variable not used in the estimation (only used for transforming other variables). A * indicates a series that is deflated with the GDP deflator (series #89). 
